

Ahead for Business 



Social Engineering



Vishing

- Contact is made by telephone
- Caller purports to be from your bank, the police or a fraud agency
- Purpose is to get you to reveal confidential information



Phishing

- Contact is made by email
- Sender impersonates well known companies such as banks
- Purpose is to get you to click on a link or attachment



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Case Study – A re-enactment

- Large Corporate Client
- Call received regarding incoming payment
- Some information was provided by caller
- Caller suggested all payments were frozen
- Requested information from the client to ‘unfreeze’



Case Study – What was happening?

- High pressure situation
- Homework done
- Used information given to her
- Reference number given
- Telephone number given
- Line held open



Case Study – What happened next?

- 2 x £70,000
- 1 x £7,000,000
- One beneficiary account
- 10 transfers
- Bank actions
- Contact from the fraudster
- Police involvement - OCG identified





Phishing

- Contact is made by email
- Sender impersonates well known companies
- Purpose is to get you to click on a link or attachment

Phishing – Email examples



‘There is a multi-media message available for you to view’



‘Confirmation of your recent booking is attached’



‘We could not deliver a parcel to you’



‘A complaint has been filed against you’



‘Receipt of online VAT submission’

Phishing – Email spoofing

The email address can be a *direct** or *indirect*** version of a genuine email domain

The body content can be a replica of a genuine message or use our logos

Hyperlinks can be masked to show as something more genuine, such as rbs.co.uk.

Name of an employee, their position and/or department can be copied



*Direct spoofing is replicating domains that we own; for example: spoofer@rbs.co.uk or spoofer@natwest.com.

** Indirect email domain spoofing uses a non-affiliated email domain but often a spoofed (friendly) 'From' field.

Phishing – Case study

From: Bankline Administration [<mailto:FAX.Bankline.Administration@rbs.co.uk>]

Sent: 22 April 2013 12:23

To:

Subject: RBS Bankline Password Reset Form

Importance: High

Thank you for your telephone call.

Please find the Re-activation form attached, send one per user ensuring only one box is selected in section 3.

Please be aware when choosing a new pin and password for the service, it is important not to use pin/passwords that you have used before but to use completely different details.

If you require any further assistance then please do not hesitate to contact us on 0845 300 4108 or via www.rbs.co.uk and one of our associates will be happy to assist you.

Regards

Bankline Product Support



Reset Form.zip (22
B)

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Never, Never, Never



We will **NEVER** ask for your full pin and password to log in to online banking



We will **NEVER** ask you to provide PIN and password or smartcard codes over the telephone




We will **NEVER** ask for any Smartcard codes to complete log-in; these are generally only used to authorise payments

Trusteer

We recommend you download Trusteer Rapport – FREE security software available from rbs.co.uk/onlinesecurity

!SCAM! Altered cheque - Handwritten



!SCAM! Cheque and payable orders fraud

Good housekeeping



Limit the number of books you hold

Check the middle and back of book

Store cheque books securely

When issuing cheques



Do not leave any gaps

Recorded and special delivery

Where possible, include references

Reconciliation



Reconcile frequently

Reconciler should not be the issuer

Verify why the cheque was issued

						NOT NEGOTIABLE	Date 26 OCT 2014
100,000	10,000	Thousands	Hundreds	Tens	Units		
ZERO	ZERO	ZERO	ZERO	NINE	FIVE	or order	£ **95-83**
Pay:							
Reference No:							
Please sign overleaf if not paying into your own bank account							

!SCAM! Mandate Fraud

How does it work?



Change of bank details instruction is given – sometimes by phone initially

Following the phone call, a fax or email 'confirmation' may be received

It appears to be on headed paper or from a genuine email address


It may refer to genuine people within each business

Purpose is to get you to change the details you make payments to

This ensures future payments are now made to the fraudster



!SCAM! Mandate Fraud



!SCAM! Mandate Fraud

Mr J Singh
ABC Limited
8th Floor
Building A
Somewhere
Somehow



Unit 1,
An Industrial Estate,
Somewhere,
Somehow
~~aboxy@abccltd.co.uk~~

Dear Mr Singh,

Further to our telephone conversation, please accept this letter as written confirmation of our change of bank details.

All future **settlements** should be made to -

Account number: 12345678
Sort code: 000000

I would be grateful if you could update your records without delay.

Please contact me directly on ~~07777 77777~~ should you have any queries.

With kind regards,

Amanda Boxy
Finance Manager, ABC Ltd

What can you do?



Check for irregularities

Contact the supplier using an independently sourced number

Confirm correct details with supplier before payment is made

Email confirmation of payments that have been made to the supplier

Undertake a proactive review of recent and pipeline requests

Speak with other employees responsible for this type of request

In summary and Q&A

Security warning:

We will **never** ask for PINS, passwords or smartcard security codes over the telephone in any circumstances.

If in doubt, call the Bankline Helpdesk.

Only individuals who have authorised access to NatWest Bankline should proceed beyond this point. For the security of customers, any unauthorised attempt to access customer bank information will be monitored and may be subject to legal action.

